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1. Introduction 
In this paper I present some theoretical considerations on consequences of Europeanization of 
policy-making on national implementation structures. More specifically, I am looking at the 
impacts related to policy design and policy formulation processes for European Union Directives.  
In Section 2, I make some general considerations on policy design and the kinds of activities that 
may be developed during policy implementation. In Section 3, I discuss the issue of design of EU 
Directives and how they, together with EU policy formulation processes, affect national policy 
implementation activities. Section 4 proposes a framework to describe and trace changes in 
national implementation structures2. Section 5 presents some general considerations on the impact 
of Europenization of policy-making on national implementation structures. Section 6 presents the 
conclusions of the paper. 
 
2. Some general considerations on policy implementation activities 
Before addressing the issue of the impact of EU policy-making on national implementation 
institutions, it is important to clarify the issue of where does the implementation of EU 
instruments start. The relationship between policy formulation and implementation has been 
researched only in domestic contexts. Studies comparing the relative influence of domestic and 
EU factors on policy performance abound, but these do not address the question of where does 
national implementation actually start for EU policies, and what activities do they assume. 
It is generally accepted that the conceptual distinction between policy formulation and policy 
implementation (proposed by De Leon in the ‘stages heuristic’ of the policy process) is difficult 
since policy formulation basically seems to happen throughout the entire policy process. I support 
the argument of Hill and Hupe (2003: 8) that “What is needed is a way of combining the 
analytical benefits offered by the ‘stages’ model with the recognition of the interaction between 
the stages.” They propose to use the term ‘policy-making’ for the process as a whole, ‘policy 
formation’ for the early part of policy-making, and ‘policy implementation’ for the latter part of 
the policy-making process. I find the idea useful and I propose to take one step further, namely to 
propose a way to conceptualize an event in the policy process as suggested in Figure 1, depending 
on the amount of policy-making performed during implementation activities. 
Since implementation activities may be very complex in terms of what types of activities are 
done with what aim/effect and by what type of actors, I find it useful to conceive of 
                                                          
1 This paper is developed as part of my four year postdoctoral research project and a book I am currently writing on the 
implementation of European Union regulations. The book contains a theoretical framework to analyze the impact of EU 
instruments’ design and policy-making processes on national implementation structures, actor-interaction processes and, 
consequently, policy outputs. The frame consists of an adaptation of the Structure-Conduct-Performance heuristic used in 
industrial economics for an actor-oriented analysis of policy implementation. Comments are welcome. Please do not 
quote without author permission. 
2 Next to EU Directives, national policy fields are also affected by EU regulations and EU Decisions, which are directly 
applicable (that is transposition on national legislation is not necessary and practical compliance must follow directly). 
While their impact on national implementation structures can also be analysed with the help of the framework proposed in 
Section 4, this paper focuses on EU Directives, because they represent the type of EU instrument that are supposed to 
enable - based on EU Treaties - a higher degree freedom for national level implementation. However, their impact 
appears often to be as pervasive as in the case of EU Regulations and Decisions.   
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implementation as a mixture of activities. I propose to differentiate two types of policy 
implementation activities that may take place sequentially or in parallel: policy-making and 
policy operationalisation. Clearly not all policies come “fully designed” at the end of the policy 
formulation process. Policy formulators may delegate - explicitly or implicitly - other actors to 
“finish the job” of policy specification. Such actors may be also political(ly elected) at  
EU/national/regional/local level or may belong to the public administration tier of governance, or 
bodies in the judicial system. But policy formulators may even pass the task directly to mixed 
public-private agents and private actors – companies, household, NGOs, who can act on their 
own or through interaction with the public administration. When political/judicial actors do not 
complete the design of policy by specifying the policy goals, policy means and schemes3 in a way 
that implementing actors are able to work with, the policy-making process continues in the 
‘implementation stage’. Policy operationalisation is performed when the policy goals, means and 
schemes are specified in a way that implementing actors are able to work with them either 
directly, or by means of applying them for the local contexts (or lower levels in the chain) in 
which they have to operate, or for types of target groups, or types of industrial / social / economic 
activities, types of technologies/resources eligible, as envisaged by the policy program etc.  
 
Policy formulation activities         Policy implementation activities 
 
        (1) 
       Policy-making        (2)   
 
Policy operationalization 
 
 
Figure 1. Types of implementation activities. 
 
In Figure 1, I represented by means of two curves two examples of policy instrument design. The 
space above each curve represents the amount of policy-making being done during policy 
formulation activities and during implementation activities. The space below each curve 
represents the amount of policy operationalisation performed during formulation and 
implementation activities. The upper curve is an example of policy instrument (1) having a 
shorter track of policy-making during the implementation phase. In this case the goals, means and 
schemes are in more detail specified at the moment of policy exit from the ‘policy formation 
zone’ as compared to policy instrument (2) following the lower curve. For this second policy, 
implementation involves a wider scope of policy-making activities.  
As regards the input and the focus of policy-making activities during implementation, I 
propose to differentiate between four categories of policy approaches as represented in Table 1. 
The ‘completeness of policy design’ as received by implementers can be generally described by 
means of clarity on policy goals, policy means and policy schemes4. The implementation of EU 
instruments by formal compliance may be seen also as a process of policy formation at national 
level. However, the difference with the formation of national legislation is that formal compliance 
                                                          
3 I referred to ‘policy means’ as to the ‘tools’ offered for the achievement of policy goals, e.g. policy instruments (e.g fiscal 
instruments, production subsides, emission standards etc), resources (financial, information, human, infrastructure etc), 
eventually also details on technical measures, technology options or location of action. I refer to ‘policy schemes’ as to the 
institutional/organizational aspects, such as actors involved and their roles and relationships, and the policy theory to 
follow for goal achievement (how policy formulators decided that policy goals can be best achieved: locus, timing and 
sequence of action of various actors pertaining to what is to be achieved). 
4 This idea draws on Matland (1995) uses a typology of policy characteristics that differentiates between low ambiguity 
and high ambiguity policies, where ambiguity refers to all aspects – goals, means, policy theory. However I find it more 
useful to refer to clarity on goals on the one hand, and clarity on means and schemes, on the other hand, based on the 
expectation that these are different types of ambiguity that may assume different types of interactions among actors, with 
possibly different bargaining mechanisms for conflict resolution.   
 3
assumes an ‘input’. The input may be any of the four situations mentioned in Table 1. Depending 
on how far the process of specifying goals, means and schemes occurred in the phase of formal 
compliance, during the phase of practical compliance the policy-making activities may continue, 
or practical compliance may consist only of policy operationalisation. 
 
Completeness of policy design 
(inputs for national implementation) 
Means and Schemes 
Goals and objectives Not (sufficiently specified) Sufficiently specified 
Clear Visionary policy approach, or  
Adaptive policy approach 
 (=> policy making during 
implementation necessary) 
Strategic policy approach 
 
 (=> ready for policy 
operationalisation) 
Vague or complex Transition policy approach or  
Symbolic policy 
 (=> policy making during 
implementation necessary) 
Ideological policy approach 
 
 (=> policy making during 
implementation necessary) 
Table 1. Inputs in policy implementation: the degree of ‘completeness’ of policy design. 
 
EU policy formation results in National policy implementation assumes 
Transition policy approach or  
Symbolic policy 
Policy making for the specification of goals, means & schemes.  
Policy operationalisation. 
Ideological policy approach Policy making for the specification of goals. 
Policy operationalisation. 
Visionary policy approach, or  
Adaptive policy approach 
Policy making for the specification of means and/or schemes.  
Policy operationalisation. 
Strategic policy approach  Policy operationalisation. 
Table 2. Activities that may be assumed by implementation activities. 
 
In Section 3, I argue that the Europenisation of policy-making has set national implementation 
institutions into a process of evolution by changing the patterns of implementation activities, from 
ones where policy-making competences have been increasingly squeezed out toward EU level, 
while policy operationalisation has been expanding from local/regional level towards national 
level. While the subsidiarity principle - guarding the design of EU Directives - is meant to 
safeguard policy-making on schemes and means at national level, the minimum harmonization 
principle has been increasingly shifting policy-making aspects of implementation activities 
towards EU level. This push and pull game between the harmonization and subsidiarity principles 
has been played in EU Committees. Being active in EU Committees, national implementation 
institutions have not been removed from policy-making activities. But they have changed locus of 
action, by this, changing also the national implementation structures.  
 
3. Policy design and policy formulation process for EU Directives  
EU Directives are adopted by the Council of Ministers and European Parliament. They are 
prepared and formally proposed by the Commission, who consults with Member States (and 
official authorities and experts of Member States), industries, interest groups. A large part of 
preparatory work is done by various types of Committees. Soft and/or legal-binding instruments 
are issued often as a follow up of Directives to clarify, specify and harmonize implementation at 
national level. These are also prepared by Committees.  
Looking from the perspective of policy approaches differentiated in Table 1, it may be argued 
that based on Article 249 EC, Directives are to be designed in the style of ‘adaptive/visionary 
policies’ (see Table 1), because Member States are required to comply with their goals / 
objectives (or “the result to be achieved”). The policy means and schemes contained in Directives 
are not binding but considered desirable for harmonization purposes. In practice, however, 
harmonization has been given increasingly more importance at EU level. Besides, the increasing 
expansion of EU policy-making into highly technical areas made it unavoidable that Directives 
also specify in great detail the policy means and schemes to be used at national level. This 
 4
happened especially during the 1980s and early 1990s (Dimitrakopoulis and Richardson 2004: 
346). Actually, in some cases, the text of the Directive may even require that the legislative or 
governmental instruments aimed at specifying policy means and/or schemes - in the process of 
national level policy making - are first submitted to the Commission to check their adequacy to 
policy goals. Failures of states to do so may result in the Commission suing the state before the 
European Court of Justice. In 1996 the ECJ ruled that national policies instruments that were not 
approved by the Commission as required as not enforceable (Dimitrakopoulis and Richardson, 
2004: 186). 
Looking at their design in practice, one can easily observe that EU Directives of all four 
policy approaches can be encountered. For example, the horizontal environmental directives may 
be considered as ideological policies: the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
(85/337/EEC as amended by 97/11/EC), the Directive 2003/35/EC providing for public 
participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programs relating to the 
environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council 
Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC, the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive 
(2001/42/EC), the Directive on Access to Environmental Information (90/313/EEC as amended 
by 2003/4/EC).  
The majority of Directives, however, were designed as ‘strategic policies’ where not only 
policy goals, but also policy the forms of policy instruments and the methods to achieve goals are 
specified5. Quite often, when Directives are not directly designed as ‘strategic policies’, they 
become so due to the adoption to increasingly more detailed implementation rules. A review of 
research literature and analysis of EU documents lead to the observation that there is a clear the 
expansion of the body of legally-binding EU implementation rules adopted by the Council, 
Commission or Committees (of member state and Commission representatives). Implementation 
rules aim to design “the administrative process to be used in implementing a particular piece of 
legislation” in a national context (Bignami 1999). Under a strategic policy design of Directives, 
the subsidiarity principle is endangered, as they design the ‘form and method’ that are legally 
under Member State competence. As Bast (2003: 9) observes; “Confronted with the presumption 
that the directive is an instrument exclusively reserved for framework legislation, the directive’s 
career indeed appears to be that of abuse of discretion”. He also aptly notices (2003: 14) that: “It 
is significant that in almost all cases in which the legal effects of an act were contested before the 
Court – e.g. the direct effect produced by the provisions of a directive – the instrumental identity 
of the act (the fact that it is a directive) was not in dispute.” 
There have been some changes in the legal framework governing the competences of 
Committees for implementation rules. The Council Decision 1999/468 replaces the 87/373 
Comitology Decision that codifies the types and operation of committees. The new rules produce 
some shifts in power, introducing a role for the European Parliament in decisions for some types 
of implementation rules. The main actors involved in the policy-making process with regard to 
EU level implementation rules are the Commission and one or more committees. Changes in 
rules and competences of Committees are important in the EU multi-level governance. 
Committees are made up of representatives of both the Commission and Members States, which 
has been seen as an instrument for guarding the interests of states in the new context of the 
Commission being the main executive authority (Dimitrakopoulis and Richardson, 2004: 340). 
Membership assumes one up to three representatives from each country and one representative of 
the Commission who is also chainman of meetings. Decisions are taken by means of qualified 
majority. Wessels (1998: 210-211) describes Committees as “vital arena for power struggle in a 
multi-level system; (…) committees are the products for a general strategy of national 
                                                          
5 For an overview of many environmental directives that can be classified as strategic policies see the summaries and 
main requirements of directives in the, Handbook for Implementation of EU Environmental Legislation, of the European 
Commission available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enlarg/handbook/handbook.htm. 
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administrations to construct and extend channels for their own participation, i.e. to establish 
access and exert influence in the political space of the EU with (…) high rating on the legitimacy 
scale”.  
Besides, the number of implementation Committees is on the increase. There are currently 
more than 400 committees active and their number is still increasing (Neuhold, 2001). Some 
committees are specialized on implementation rules for formal compliances (national 
transposition) while other direct their activities at practical compliance. Comitology can be seen 
as the main lever in the Europenisation of national administrative systems.  
The 1999/468 Decision specifies also the circumstances when the Commission should use 
each of the three types of Committees (which was not done under the 1987/373 Decision):  
- management committees need to be used in cases of “management measures such as those 
relating to the application of the common agricultural and common fisheries policies, or to the 
implementation of programs with substantial budgetary implications”; 
- regulatory committees are required for  “measures of general scope designed to apply essential 
provisions of basic instruments, including measures concerning the protection of the health or 
safety of humans, animals or plants, as well as measures designed to adapt or update certain non-
essential provisions of a basic instrument”; 
- advisory committees are involved when “it is considered to be the most appropriate”. 
The three types of committees limit the discretion of the Commission to issue implementation 
rules to different extent. The input of the activities of these committees is represented by a 
proposal by the Commission on how to implement a certain Community policy. The opinion of 
an advisory committee has no formal consequences. However, when the proposal is submitted to 
a management or regulatory committees, when they vote against or issue no opinion on the 
proposal, the Commission is formally required to submit the proposal for approval by the Council 
of Ministers. The positive opinion of management committees implies the direct adoption of the 
respective implementation rules by the Commission. The consequences of a negative opinion 
from a regulatory committee are more complex. As Bignami (1999) describes it: “If a regulatory 
committee delivers an unfavorable opinion or no opinion at all, Parliament must be informed of 
the Commission's proposal to the Council. If Parliament opposes the proposal, it informs the 
Council, which may ‘where appropriate in view of any such position’ act on the Commission's 
proposal. Like the Commission, it appears that the Council is required to take account of 
Parliament's position, but is not bound by that position.” The type of committee and the 
associated procedure for adopting implementation rules may also have impacts on the legitimacy 
perception of national implementing actors during both formal compliance and practical 
compliance. Neuhold (2001: 15-17) explains that there are three major lines of criticism to the 
activities of committees: high complexity, lack of transparency and lack of accountability:  
- the decision procedures are difficult to follow by stakeholders;  
- “it is difficult to obtain information about what decisions are taken and how”; the lack of 
transparency implies that “committees are regarded as a Trojan horse, by which national 
interests are “carried into” the implementation process of community law;”  
- officials representing Member States are exclusively accountable to their government, 
which yields concerns of democratic legitimacy.  
These considerations imply that the locus of policy-making activities associated with national 
implementation of Directives have been increasingly shifted upwards. In these cases, the main 
focus at national and sub-national governance levels often becomes policy operationalisation. An 
important consequence is that some aspects of the national implementation structure applying to 
that policy are already specified at EU level. But this also attracts changes in the type and 
allocation of discretion among actors at national level, actor-function aspects and interaction 
patterns, competences and patterns of resource distribution and so on.  The next section presents a 
framework for the description of implementation structures. 
 
 6
4. Aspects and dimensions for the analysis of national implementation structures 
I conceive of implementation structure for a policy program/instrument as a set of relationships 
among organizations (not among individuals as Hjern and Porter [1982] consider) involved in the 
transformation of policy intentions into policy outputs. It is assumed that individuals take up 
institutional roles and organizations can be seen as actors in the implementation process. 
Implementation structures can be described by positioning the actors in the governance context - 
public authorities at different levels (local, regional, national or EU), private actors, various types 
of mixed agents. The actor configuration analysis should help specify the distribution, type and 
flow of the various types of resources and information streams necessary for implementation. But 
in the same time it is helpful in getting a picture of the degree of complexity of an implementation 
structure. I propose to describe the national implementation structures in terms of: 1) dimensions, 
which include: financial structure, actor-function structures, (type of) discretion structure, 
decision-making mechanisms, techno-resource structure and information structures; 2) 
governance configuration: single level (single organization or multiple organizations) or multi-
level governance; 3) the degree of complexity of the implementation structure: unique, nested, 
parallel (adjacent). Figure 2 presents the framework for the analysis of implementation structures.  
    
                      financial structure 
 
 
                      information structure                                                              actor function structure 
 
                governance configuration                   
         decision-making mechanisms                   complexity of structure                          discretion structure 
 
 
 
     techno-resource structure 
 
Figure 2. The elements for the analysis of implementation structures. 
 
The implementation structure has several core dimensions: the information structure, the financial 
structure accessible for implementation, the discretion structure, the approvals/permitting 
structure, decision-making mechanisms, and the techno-resource structure. Drawing on both 
empirical and theoretical literature, I present here some key aspects of the selected dimensions 
that may need analysis for the study of implementation process and results of individual policies. 
The aspects that may need to be studied regarding the information structure refer to both 
procedure-wise information and content-wise information:  
- the information flow across actors involved: who gets informed, when, about what, and with 
what consequences; the identity and roles of other actors involved in implementation;   
- frequency and scope of interaction among involved actors; 
- the timing and extent of consultations with those affected by implementation (target group 
communication);  
- mechanisms for dealing with contestable scientific/technical information on which 
implementation relies (goal/objective related information, means related information, process 
related etc). 
- mechanisms to ensure compliance such as reporting and monitoring requirements and ex-post 
evaluation at EU and member state level. 
- clarity on accountability lines and responsibility lines which influence the type of discretion 
actors have in implementation;  
- information regarding ‘what and how to implement’: the availability and accessibility of 
various types of resources needed for implementation – financial, technical, permits and 
approvals, guidelines for investments or solution design (e.g. best practice); here the 
mechanisms of knowledge collection and knowledge dissemination are important; 
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- the level of actor awareness on the issue at policy-focus; 
- level of actor experience with the policy issue or instrument at hand, that determines the 
extent of learning during implementation. 
The aspects that may need to be studied regarding the financing structure refer to: 
- the financing of (technical) measures or investments required for policy implementation and 
the ability to pass on such costs to others such as clients, consumers, or even to a budget 
related fund; (costs and benefits of policy); 
- who (how many actors) finances the implementation and what is the extent of contribution? 
Does this depend on other actors’ financial contribution, non-financial services, or side-
payments? Does this depend on developments in other policy areas, the evolution of the 
implementation processes itself, or developments internal to the financing actors? 
The aspects that may need to be studied regarding the techno-resource structure refer to: 
- the availability of resource, technical and technological options as required by policy;  
- the presence of alternative options that may compete with the techno-resource options 
required by the policy; 
- how do the required techno-resource investments fit into the available techno-resource infra-
structure. 
As regards the discretion structure, I find it useful to use the discretion typology proposed by 
John Burke (1990) by relating two concepts: responsibility - what follow-up steps should or 
should not be taken, and accountability of policy implementers - whether there is a requirement to 
account to others for those actions: higher authorities, themselves, clients, peers, etc. 
Responsibility may originate in external sources “when the direction over the implementation 
process is largely defined by institutions, processes and persons (e.g. higher political authorities 
or the public) who are external to those actually engaged in implementing policy”. In this case 
there is actually very little discretion available to implementers. But responsibility may also 
originate in internal norms when “policy implementers posses greater authority to make 
substantive decisions”. In this case the discretion of policy goal specification available to 
implementers is larger. Accountability: may be strong when there are “appeals to formal legal 
dictates or to expertise” or it may be weak in case of “inability to frame convincing accounts for 
acts of discretion”. The typology is reproduced (with adaptation) in Table 3. Therefore, when 
discussing the formal power relations among public implementing agents, four types of discretion 
can be differentiated (cf. Burke 1990): formal-legal (strong accountability; external 
responsibility); professional (strong accountability; internal responsibility); fragmented (weak 
accountability; external responsibility); and personal-vision (weak accountability; internal 
responsibility). 
 
Accountability / 
Responsibility 
External sources of responsibility  
(little discretion) 
Internal sources of responsibility  
(internal norms for policy implementation) 
Strong I. Formal-legal  II. Professional 
Weak III. Fragmented implementation IV. Personal political and moral views 
Table 3. A typology of implementers’ discretion developed by John Burke (1990: 137) 
 
As regards the decision-making mechanisms their discussion needs to be related to the 
governance configuration. The idea is that they may make a difference especially for the timing 
and adequacy of implementation. I consider the typology advanced by Scharpf for actors’ 
interaction in games as a suitable way to analyze the role of decision-making mechanisms in 
implementation processes. Scharpf differentiates between unilateral action, negotiated agreement, 
majority voting or hierarchical direction (1997: 12) as modes of interaction defined by the 
institutional setting. However it is necessary to be more nuanced and differentiate between three 
types of hierarchical direction. In some cases decisions may be taken by a certain authority 
unilaterally or ‘in isolation’, based on its own reasons, understanding, interests and so on. In other 
cases a hierarchical decision may be preceded by consultation with other actors that is formally 
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required, or even an agreement may be necessary according to the legal framework, for a certain 
authority to formulate a decision. To this typology I would still like to add the ‘spot market 
exchange’ mechanism. Research experience suggests that this type of decision mechanism may 
be involved as well in implementation, especially in those cases when the policy works by 
facilitating interaction among target group members.  
Decision-making mechanisms are especially important aspects in the study of multi-
organisation implementation. For example a negotiation-based decision mechanism that relies 
heavily on consultations and distributive bargaining may attract long delays in implementation. A 
mechanism that allows for unilateral hierarchical direction by a certain actor, while involving in 
the same time resource commitments - e.g financial, informational or technological - by other 
actors may negatively influence the motivation of the ‘left-aside’ actors, creating obstacles in the 
availability of resource for (adequate) implementation. Disagreements between different 
governance levels – e.g. local and national – are frequent, while they also often play different 
roles in implementation, with local authorities generally largely responsible for the allocation or 
coordination of various types of resources and information relevant for implementation. 
Finally, the implementation structure needs to be discussed also in terms of actor-function. 
This is considered as a ‘resource dimension’ because the role/position that an actor has in 
implementation may enable him to take certain actions or obstructs his (formal) engagement in 
some processes. This variable communicates regarding what he is formally or informally capable 
of doing; what is allowed or demanded or simply seen ‘desirable’ and to what extent. It is 
necessary to distinguish between6: 
a) actors directly involved in making various kinds of decisions or accomplishing tasks that 
can be seen for example as steps towards/in an implementation strategy or a more 
concrete implementation plan; examples here: filling in the gaps of policy design 
(specifying goals/means/schemes) giving various kinds of approvals or permits, verifying 
information provided by others, monitoring an activity, and so on; 
b) actors that are in one way or another behind or around the actors involved in decision-
making through some sort of activities such as: giving guidance or formal/informal 
advise, elaborating proposals, functioning as a discussion platform, lobbying (various 
sorts of stakeholders), acting as moderator in policy negotiations;  
c) actors that are members of the target group, and 
d) actors that hold resources relevant for implementation, but who are not included in the 
process (by policy design intention or by lack of awareness; these resources may be 
relevant only for target group actions or only for public implementers’ action or for both). 
This actor differentiation may raise the question of ‘who may be in ‘group [a] actors’ seen from 
the perspective of the nature of actors - public administration / political agents, private agents, 
mixed agents?’.  
- As regards formal compliance, the actor is the legislative body; 
- As regards practical compliance assuming policy-making activities, it is more likely that this 
would involve either only public administrative bodies, or a mixture of public, private and/or 
mixed agents. 
- As regards practical compliance assuming policy operationalisation, implementation 
circumstances may be so diverse that any of such actors may be in group [a].  
When policy intentions have to be put into practice, various numbers and types of actors may 
become involved in the act of implementation. Figure 3 presents the possible ‘governance 
configurations’ of implementation structures. 
                                                          
6 The distinction regards only the key roles. Hence it does not exclude that - for instance - the target group or group [d] 
actors may also be involved as group [b] actors. A practical example is the situation emerged in the implementation of 
wind energy projects in Spain. There, local municipalities and local energy agencies involved in giving certain types of 
permits (environmental, administrative-planning, grid-connection) - hence group [a] - were themselves eligible to be 
investors and therefore they were in the same time members of the target group. 
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Tracing the governance configuration means tracing the actors involved. The question is how 
to define the governance configuration of an implementation structure having in view the four 
categories of actors, differentiated under the ‘action-function’ resource dimension. One may 
prefer to take into account all actors that play any kind of role in implementation. But this means 
that basically there will always be only ‘multi-level’ type of configuration. I consider that it 
would be more appropriate to make the categorization of single-level / multi-level by looking at 
the actors directly involved in making various kinds of decisions, or whose approval / design of 
various activities is necessary as part of the implementation process (group [a]). This does not 
deny that the other three categories of actors can play an essential role in the process and policy 
outputs. But for the sake of analytical clarity their actions and consequences of their involvement 
can be better studied along the resource dimensions of the implementation structure: actor-
function, financing structure, techno-resource structure, information structure and types of 
decision mechanisms. 
                           
      Single level implementation 
                   Single organization 
 
    Governance configuration          Two actor implementation 
      
     Multiple organizations        
             
                        Multi-level implementation      
 
Figure 3. The ‘governance configuration’ aspect of the implementation structure 
 
With these analytical rules in mind, it can be then considered that implementation takes place at a 
single governance level, when it comes to straightforward tasks such as issuing a water-use 
permit to an industrial production company. Although the local public implementing body having 
this task may have around actors assisting with advice (not formally required), or stakeholders 
exercising lobbying, as long as there is no other body that needs to give a formal approval as 
condition for the issue of the water-use permit, this should be seen as a single governance level 
configuration. There may be cases when more organizations share responsibilities for various 
aspects of transforming policy intentions into outputs. The sharing and interaction of these 
‘various aspects’ of implementation may be studied with the help of the different types of 
resource-dimensions and degrees of complexity of implementation structure. The practical 
compliance with EU regulations may involve also EU institutions and agencies in direct contact 
with for example local actors. 
The complexity of implementation structures refers to both the governance configuration and 
to its resource dimensions. Policy programs often involve different types of actors, for the various 
types of policy instruments, or types of target groups they address, or for the various policy goals 
envisaged by the program. The clusters of actors involved for the different aspects of the policy 
may be working for implementation ‘next to each other’, or they may have ‘partially overlapping’ 
tasks and responsibilities, while in some policy programs there may be a unique set of actors 
responsible for all policy goals and means.  
In a similar vein, policy programs may require the same (highly similar) resource structures 
for implementation. But they may also invoke different arrangements, e.g. different financing 
structures, or types of discretion for the various types of policy instruments, or target groups, or 
policy goals envisaged. Similarly they may create different actor-function structures or techno-
resource structures for implementation by different types of target groups. The questions emerge: 
Is there is a unique implementation structure for the respective policy, or are there different 
nested or adjacent structures? What are the consequences for the various aspects of performance 
of implementation? What are the consequences of complexity at the level of governance 
configuration, in contrast to complexities at the level of resources and information allocation and 
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flow? Figure 4 summarizes the typology for the complexity of structure aspect of implementation.  
 
                            Unique structure per policy 
 
          Complexity of   Unique structure:        per type of policy instrument  
  implementation structure           per type of target group  
    Differentiated structure:       per policy goal / objective  
  
     
   Nested        Adjacent  
 
Figure 4. A typology of implementation structure’ complexity. 
 
Implementation structures emergence from the interaction of EU policy design and domestic 
factors and other policies pertaining to the respective instrument. The degree of detail in the 
specification of policy design (including extent of derogations) will influence the degree of 
variation in the features of national implementation structures from country to country. The close 
inspection of the implementation structure based on the descriptive lines traced in this Section, 
should support the analysis of who are the implementing actors, what are they responsible for, 
and what is the distribution and flow of resources (legal, material, informal) and information 
relevant for implementation. The degree to which such information about the implementation 
structure itself is clear may differ however from policy to policy, as well as for the two phases of 
implementation. The implementation structure can be seen as an ‘under construction’ element, 
which takes a clearer shape as implementation activities unfold. Hence, the implementation 
structure has a dual role: as ‘space to work within’ and as ‘space to be designed’ for the follow-up 
activities of the same actors, or other implementation actors. When policy-making activities take 
place, aiming to (further) design the policy schemes and means, some or all aspects of the 
implementation structure may not be defined or clear. When policy-making activities take place, 
aiming to specify the goals of the policy program, while the means and schemes have been 
sufficiently clear and completely spelled out in the previous policy activities, the implementation 
structure may to be more clearly traced than in the preceding example.  
 
5. Considerations on the impact of Europenization of policy-making on national 
implementation structures 
Europenization of policy-making is an important development whose impacts on national 
implementation can be studied at different levels. One is the macro level – on which I focus in 
this paper – which takes into account the generally applicable (range of) policy design (options) 
of EU instruments and the general mechanisms of policy formulation at EU level for both 
Directives and their legally-binding implementation rules. At this level, only general 
considerations can be made regarding the consequences for national implementation structures. 
They regard especially the aspects of ‘governance configuration’ for the different aspects of 
implementation (policy making and/or policy operationalization activities), the ‘type of 
discretion’ available for various national actors, the actor-function aspect and the information 
structure aspect of implementation structures, as well as the decision-making mechanisms for 
policy-making during implementation.  
A second level is that of a policy field such as agriculture, environmental, energy, 
competition, etc. Research at this level allows one to be more specific about the policy design 
features and particular forms of policy-formulation actors and processes for that field, that can 
help specify the way in which the elements and dimensions of the national implementation 
structure for that field changed as result of Europenization, or may be expected to change in the 
future. A more complete picture may be realized by lowering to the third level of analysis, 
namely an individual EU Directive and its associated implementation rules. At this third level it 
will be possible to fill in all the forms of variables describing national implementation structures. 
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The more the values of these variables are filled in by EU Directive design and/or their associated 
implementation rules, the more pervasive the influence of the EU is on national implementation 
structures. The framework proposed in Section 4 may be used for this purpose to more easily 
trace changes in time in a certain policy field for a country, or compare how two or more 
countries have implemented a certain EU Directive, and hence to analyze the extent to which 
homogenisation of national implementation institutions took place under a certain EU Directive.  
At the more general level it can be argued that the ‘governance configuration’ and ‘type of 
discretion’ for national implementation activities have changed by introducing EU actors 
(Commission, Committees, and indirectly the EU Parliament) as ‘group [a]’ of actors in the 
formal compliance process with EU Directives, based on ‘formal-legal’ type of discretion 
(external responsibility and strong accountability - see Table 3) over national legislative actors. 
The only actor traditionally and uniquely responsible the transposition of supra-national policy 
programs into national legislation has been the Parliament, with the Government often acting on 
its behalf (and a series of national actors being involved in consulations). However the 
requirement to have some transposition of national instruments approved first by the Commission 
adds EU institutions to this process. But even when such requirements do not apply, the 
Commission guards over the formal compliance and practical compliance and has the right to ask 
the European Court of Justice impose compliance, including by means of fines. Further, in some 
circumstances committees can bee seen as ‘group [b]’ of factors, when they prepare documents to 
be approved by others – the Commission, or the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament. 
However, committees have no legal power to enforce implementation rules.  
As regards the type of discretion during practical compliance activities, public administration 
actors in Member States experience restrictions: although all four types of discretion mentioned 
in Table 3 may be encountered in the various policy fields, there appears to be an increasing 
dominance of the ‘formal-legal’ and ‘professional’ types of discretion in relation to EU 
institutions. This means that EU exercises increasingly strong accountability mechanisms. When 
harmonization interests are considered dominant this is accompanied by ‘external responsibility’ 
(cf. Burke, 1990), resulting in ‘legal-formal’ type of discretion. When the subsidiarity principle is 
given priority, national implementers are allowed to use internal norms for policy implementation 
which leads to ‘professional type of discretion’. However, in some policy fields, or with regard to 
some EU Directives, the Commission may not exercise ‘strong accountability’ in practice – be it 
due to low political priority, or workload. In such cases the use of ‘fragmented implementation’ 
or ‘personal political views’ of national implementers may be observed.  
As regards the actor-function dimension, target groups and stakeholders are given new 
opportunities to influence implementation rules directly, by means consultations (suggesting also 
a horizontal/sidewards shift in EU governance). Target groups become also members of ‘group 
[b]’ types of actors, although this may happen to different degree in the various policy fields. 
NGOs are a continuously growing actor-category in the processes of formulating EU 
implementation rules. According to Wessels (1998: 226) “In 1995 there were 1998 
representations of interest groups in a restricted interpretation and 2175 in a broader version. 
Their level of organization differs from one policy field to another with apparently more 
advanced organization of action and relationships in corporatist policy fields such as agriculture.” 
The decision-making mechanisms for policy-making during implementation have also 
different patterns. Formerly, national implementers with policy-making competences could 
design implementation rules based on unilateral hierarchical decision, or hierarchical decisions 
based on consultations or agreements with other national actors. Under the Europenization of 
policy-making, increasingly more decisions are taken by the representatives of Member States in 
Committees where ‘majority vote’ is the decision mechanism. The details of the decision-
procedure differ from one policy field to another, which means that the analysis need to lower at 
the level of policy field or even policy instrument in order to make more precise pronouncement 
on how the Europenization of policy-making affects this dimension of national implementation 
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structure. However, at macro level, the decision mechanisms of negotiated agreement and 
majority vote appear to become increasingly more important in implementing EU Directives. 
Insights into the impacts of the Europenization of policy-making on the dimensions of 
‘complexity of implementation structures’, and the dimensions of information structures, 
financing structures, and techno-resource structures can be best gain by lowering the level of 
analysis at the level of policy field or even individual EU Directives.  
 
5. Conclusions 
A major general factor in the changes of national implementation structures has been the change 
in the content of policy implementation activities. Considering policy implementation as a 
mixture of policy-making (on policy means and/or policy schemes) and policy operationalisation 
activities, it may be argued that an increasing extent of policy-making activities take place at EU 
level - either directly by means of EU Directives’ design or by means of EU implementation rules 
- while policy operationalisation activities often become the main activity in the national content. 
The push and pull game between the harmonization principle and the subsidiarity principle - 
played to large extent in the EU Commission and the hundreds of EU Committees - seems to 
have resulted in the domination of the harmonization principle. The impact of this on national 
implementation structures differs from one policy field to another and detailed insights may be 
best gain by the analysis of the EU Directives applicable to the respective policy field, as well as 
EU Regulations and Decisions which are entirely legally-binding (as to the policy goals, means 
and schemes they may include). Implementation structures may be analyzed in terms of 
‘governance configuration’ for implementation, ‘complexity of governance’ and various 
‘resource dimensions’, as proposed in Section 4. The more the values of these variables are filled 
in by EU Directive design and/or their associated implementation rules, the more policy-making 
activities assumed by the implementation process have already shifted upwards, at EU level, 
while national implementation institutions have evolved to develop policy operationalisation 
activities, with consequences for actor roles, the motivation and resources of implementing 
agents, relationships among actors. In turn these may affect policy outputs in ways that need to be 
more closely researched.  
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